In Florida, property tax assessments are adjusted once a year. On January 1, the property value and the total tax owed are set for that year. However, there is a method by which to reduce your total tax assessments. To obtain a tax reduction during the year, you must show that the property was overvalued at the time that the value was set which is January 1.
Sometime in August of this year you will receive what is called a TRIM notice (truth in millage (TRIM) notices), from the Property Appraisers Office. As soon as you receive this notice, you should contact our office, so, that we can assist you in trying to reduce your total tax assessment.
First, we will conduct a thorough analysis of your property which includes a review of the current asking prices for properties comparable to yours in your area as well as recent sales in your area.
Then, we will organize and prepare the necessary documentation to file a property tax appeal petition for you. Once the petition is filed, you case will be set for a hearing in the county where the property is located before the County Value Adjustment Board. The Value Adjustment Board (the “VAB”) is an independent governmental agency created by Chapter 194, of the Florida Statutes, to accept and process taxpayers’ petitions contesting the value of real estate and personal property as assessed by the Property Appraiser’s Office. The VAB is composed of five elected officials, specifically three County Commissioners and two School Board members. One of the Commissioners is required to serve as the VAB Chairperson. Prior to the hearing we will negotiate with your property appraiser to discuss your tax assessment and seek a negotiated adjustment of your tax assessment which will ultimately reduce your property tax bill.
If we are unable to negotiate a reduced tax assessment prior to the hearing before the VAB, we will represent you at the hearing in order to reduce your tax assessment.
If your TRIM notice does not properly set the value of your property, we can file a tax appeal and challenge the Property Appraiser’s valuation. Please note, that a tax appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days following the issuance of the TRIM notice. After the hearing, if the petitioner disagrees with the Special Magistrate’s recommendation to the VAB, a further appeal of the VAB decision may be initiated by the taxpayer filing suit in the Circuit Court. Any such suit (i.e. other than homestead exemption denials) must be filed no later than 60 days from the mailing of the VAB’s record of decision notice to the taxpayer.
We can the stress the importance of skilled legal counsel to assist you in an attempt to obtain a reduction of your tax assessment. The Property Appraiser will present facts which they believe substantiate their appraisal. Legal counsel can often anticipate these arguments and assist you with presenting evidence negating the appraisal.
When negotiating a Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure in Florida be sure to have the lender agree to waive or release you from any deficiency in the difference between the mortgage amount owed and the ultimate market value of the property. This will prevent the lender from suing you in the future for that deficiency. A Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure will provide you no benefit unless you receive a waiver or relase of the deficency.
Just because you are not able to pay your mortgage it does not mean that you do not have a right to defend a foreclosure in Florida. In defending a foreclosure, it is imperative to review all of the documents that you have in your possession from your closing. There are various federal laws and state laws that require lenders to comply with in closing a home purchase, such as the Truth in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Furthermore during the real estate boom, it became common practice for lenders to inflate the income of homeowners in the Uniform Residential Loan Application in order to qualify the borrower for a larger loan than he or she could afford. Don’t forget that in Florida you have rights and one of those rights is to defend your foreclosure.
On Sunday March 1, 2009, the New York Times wrote an article regarding Ana Fernandez, who’s home had been sold by the bank, however, the Law Office of Ray Garcia, P.A. in its representation of Ms. Fernandez was able to set aside the sale and set aside the summary judgment. The bank, Chevy Chase failed to produce the Note and there was no eveidence that the originating lender had assigned the Note to Chevy Chase.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/01/business/01gret.html
In HSBC v. Socorro Hernandez, Case No.: 08-53265 filed in the 17th Circuit Court for Broward County, Florida, the Law Office of Ray Garcia, P.A. prevails on HSBC’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Judge Rothschild in Broward County, Florida denies HSBC’s Motion for Summary Judgment and allows homeowner Socorro Hernandez to continue to defend the foreclosure filed against her.
By Brian Grow <http://www.businessweek.com/print/bios/Brian_Grow.htm>,
Keith Epstein <http://www.businessweek.com/print/bios/Keith_Epstein.htm>
and Robert Berner
<http://www.businessweek.com/print/bios/Robert_Berner.htm>
The bad mortgages that got the current financial crisis started have
produced a terrifying wave of home foreclosures. Unless the foreclosure
surge eases, even the most extravagant federal stimulus spending won’t
spur an economic recovery.
The Obama Administration is expected within the next few weeks to
announce an initiative of $50 billion or more to help strapped
homeowners. But with 1 million residences having fallen into foreclosure
since 2006, and an additional 5.9 million expected over the next four
years, the Obama plan—whatever its details—can’t possibly do the job by
itself. Lenders and investors will have to acknowledge huge losses and
figure out how to keep recession-wracked borrowers making at least some
monthly payments.
So far the industry hasn’t shown that kind of foresight. One reason
foreclosures are so rampant is that banks and their advocates in
Washington have delayed, diluted, and obstructed attempts to address the
problem. Industry lobbyists are still at it today, working overtime to
whittle down legislation backed by President Obama that would give
bankruptcy courts the authority to shrink mortgage debt. Lobbyists say
they will fight to restrict the types of loans the bankruptcy proposal
covers and new powers granted to judges.
The industry strategy all along has been to buy time and thwart
regulation, financial-services lobbyists tell /BusinessWeek/ . “We were
like the Dutch boy with his finger in the dike,” says one business
advocate who, like several colleagues, insists on anonymity, fearing
career damage. Some admit that, in retrospect, their clients, which
include Bank of America (BAC Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase,
would have been better off had they agreed two years ago to address
foreclosures systematically rather than pin their hopes on an unlikely
housing rebound.
In public, financial institutions insist they’ve done their best to
prevent foreclosures. Most argue that giving bankruptcy courts increased
clout, known as cramdown authority, would reward irresponsible borrowers
and result in higher borrowing costs. “What we’re trying to do now is
target the bill to make it as narrow as possible,” says Scott Talbott, a
lobbyist for the Financial Services Roundtable. On the defensive, the
industry nevertheless benefits from one strain of popular opinion that
home buyers who took on risky mortgages—even if the industry pushed
those loans—don’t deserve to be rescued.
AN INDUSTRY IN DENIAL
However the skirmish ends, the industry’s contention that it has done as
much as possible to limit foreclosures seems hollow. Some statistics it
cites appear to be exaggerated. Even pro-industry figures such as Steven
C. Preston, a Republican businessman who headed the Housing & Urban
Development Dept. late in the Bush Administration, concede that many
lenders have dragged their heels. “The industry still has not stepped up
to the volume of the problem,” Preston says. One program, Hope for
Homeowners—which Bush officials and banks promised last fall would shield 400,000 families from foreclosure—has so far produced only 25 refinanced loans.
Meanwhile, an already glutted market sinks beneath the weight of more
foreclosed homes. Borrowers whose equity has evaporated have nothing to
tap into if the recession costs them their jobs. Some lawmakers and
regulators are calling for a foreclosure moratorium. “People are falling
through the cracks,” Preston says. “That’s bad for communities, bad for
the individuals losing their homes, and bad for investors.”
In early 2007, as overextended borrowers began to default on
too-good-to-be-true subprime mortgages, housing experts sounded an alarm heard throughout Washington. Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.), chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, wanted to push a bill requiring banks to
modify loans whose enticingly low “teaser” interest rates soon give way
to tougher terms. But he knew that with Republicans strongly opposed, he
lacked the muscle, according to Senate aides. So Dodd did what
politicians often do. He convened a talkfest: the Homeownership
Preservation Summit.
A who’s who of banking executives gathered on Apr. 18, 2007, behind
closed doors in an ornate hearing room in the marble-faced Dirksen
Senate Office Building. Dodd told them they needed to get out in front
of the foreclosure fiasco by adjusting loan terms so borrowers would
continue to make some payments, rather than stopping altogether.
Foreclosure proceedings typically cost banks about 50% of a property’s
value. That’s assuming the home can be resold—not a certainty when empty
houses multiply in a neighborhood. “What are you doing?” Dodd asked the
executives. “What do you need me to do to help you modify loans?”
Some from the industry denied a foreclosure problem existed, including
Sandor E. Samuels, at the time chief legal officer of subprime giant
Countrywide Financial. They vowed to continue selling loans with
enticing introductory rates as well as those requiring minimal evidence
of borrowers’ income. “We are going to keep making these loans until the
last second they are legal,” Samuels later told a fellow participant.
On May 2, 2007, Dodd’s office issued a “Statement of Principles”
stemming from the summit. It outlined seven vaguely worded industry
aspirations, such as making “early contact” with strapped borrowers and
offering modifications that could include lowering loan balances. The
principles had no effect, some summit participants now concede.
Much of Dodd’s attention shifted to his campaign for the Democratic
Presidential nomination. Senate Banking Committee spokeswoman Kate
Szostak says Dodd aggressively pursued the foreclosure issue, but “both
the industry and the Bush Administration refused to heed his warnings.”
The lawmaker accepted $5.9 million in contributions from the
financial-services industry in 2007 and 2008.
Asked about his role at the summit, Samuels confirmed in an e-mail that
he “did speak—formally and informally—about the performance” of subprime
loans. But he declined to elaborate. He now works as a top in-house
lawyer for Bank of America, which acquired Countrywide in July 2008.
A major reason financial institutions and investors are so determined to
avoid modifying loan terms more aggressively has to do with accounting
nuances, say industry lobbyists. If, for example, a bank lowered the
balance of a certain mortgage, there would be a strong argument that it
would have to reduce the value on its balance sheet of all similar
mortgages in the same geographic area to reflect the danger that the
region had hit an economic slump. Under this stringent approach,
financial industry mortgage-related losses could far surpass even the
grim $1.1 trillion estimated by Goldman Sachs in January. A desire to postpone this devastating situation helps explain lenders’ intransigence, says Rick Sharga, vice-president of marketing at RealtyTrac, an Irvine (Calif.) firm that analyzes foreclosure patterns.
By mid-2007, Bush Administration officials were deeply worried about the
financial industry’s unwillingness to confront the growing catastrophe.
Even banking lobbyists say they realized that their clients had lapsed
into denial. The K Street representatives agreed that Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson needed to step in, says Erick R. Gustafson, then the chief
lobbyist for the Mortgage Bankers Assn. “It was like an intervention,”
he says. “We had to get Treasury involved to get the banks to give us
information.”
That summer, Paulson, a former CEO of Goldman Sachs, summoned industry
executives to the Cash Room, one of Treasury’s most elegant venues.
There, beneath replica gaslight chandeliers, Neel T. Kashkari, a junior
Goldman banker whom Paulson had brought to Treasury, urged industry
leaders to move swiftly to keep more consumers from losing their homes.
Bankers know how to adjust interest rates, extend loan durations, and,
if necessary, lower principal, said Kashkari, who has temporarily
remained in his post. A couple of months later, Paulson summoned the
executives again, this time to his conference room. “We told them we
need to get over the goal line,” recalls a former top Treasury official.
“Cajoling is a euphemism for what we did. We pounded them.”
One product of the Treasury conclaves was the Hope Now Alliance, a
government-endorsed private sector organization announced by Paulson on
Oct. 10, 2007. Lenders promised to cooperate with nonprofit credit
counselors who would help borrowers prevent defaults. Faith Schwartz, a
former subprime mortgage executive, was put in charge.
WINDOW DRESSING?
The alliance got off to a shaky start. An early press release contended
that there had been more foreclosures nationally than the Mortgage
Bankers Assn. was conceding at the time. “We looked like the Keystone
Kops,” says an industry lobbyist. Soon it became apparent that the
program was primarily a public-relations effort, the lobbyist says.
“Hope Now is really just a vehicle for collecting and marketing
information to the Treasury, people on the Hill, and the news media.”
In a press release last Dec. 22, Hope Now said it had prevented 2.2
million foreclosures in 2008 by arranging for borrowers to catch up on
delinquent payments and, in some cases, easing terms. But the data don’t
reveal how many borrowers are falling back into default because many
modifications don’t, in fact, reduce monthly payments. The alliance
doesn’t receive this information from banks, says Schwartz.
There’s reason for skepticism. Federal banking regulators reported in
December 2008 that fully 53% of consumers receiving loan modifications
were again delinquent on their mortgages after six months. Alan M.
White, a law professor at Valparaiso University, says the redefault
rates are high because modifications often lead to higher rather than
lower payments. An analysis White did of a sample of 21,219 largely
subprime mortgages modified in November 2008 found that only 35% of the
cases resulted in lower payments. In 18%, payments stayed the same; in
the remaining 47%, they rose. The reason for this strange result:
Lenders and loan servicers are tacking on missed payments, taxes, and
big fees to borrowers’ monthly bills.
Consider the case of Ocbaselassie Kelete, a 41-year-old immigrant from
Eritrea who called Hope Now last fall. Kelete, a naturalized U.S.
citizen, bought a $540,000 townhouse in Hayward, Calif., in November
2006 with no down payment and 100% financing from First Franklin
Financial, a subprime unit of Merrill Lynch. At the time, he and his
wife earned $108,000 a year from his two jobs, with a pharmacy and an
office-cleaning service, and hers as a janitor. Kelete says First
Franklin and his realtor convinced him that he could afford a pair of
mortgages, one with a 7.5% initial rate that would rise after three
years, and a second with a fixed 12% rate. His monthly payment would
total $3,600.
“WORK WITH ME”
“The realtor said, ‘Just make sacrifices for two years. Home prices will
go up, and you can refinance at a lower rate,’ ” Kelete recalls. He
regrets signing a mortgage he couldn’t afford—a mistake many people made
during the subprime craze. Home prices didn’t go up. He lost his
office-cleaning job. First Franklin modified his loans, but added on
property taxes it had failed to collect earlier. Kelete’s monthly bill
rose to $3,900. In October 2008, he called Hope Now. A counselor set up
a conference call with First Franklin. The lender’s representative said
Kelete should get another job or give up the house, the borrower says.
Kelete responded that he’d already lost his second job cleaning offices
and couldn’t find another in a faltering California economy. “Why don’t
you work with me?” he asked First Franklin. The lender declined. The
Hope Now counselor said there was nothing more to do. “Foreclosure is
the only future I see,” Kelete says. A spokesman for BofA, which
acquired Merrill in December, declined to comment, citing the borrower’s
privacy. After /BusinessWeek/’s inquiries, however, First Franklin
contacted Kelete about lowering his monthly payments.
Hope Now’s Schwartz acknowledges she is fighting an uphill battle. By
her calculation, 45% of the borrowers her organization advises still end
up in foreclosure. “If I seem frustrated,” she says, “it’s because we
are dealing with nothing but an exploding problem.” She has a full-time
staff of four in Washington; 500 counselors participate in the
industry-funded hotline. “You shouldn’t take it lightly, what we have
achieved,” Schwartz says. She bristles at suggestions that the
statistics she disseminates are misleading. “I print what I know,” she
says, noting that some of her bank members aren’t forthcoming about loan
modifications. “It’s like herding and juggling cats.”
By early 2008 it was obvious that Hope Now wasn’t halting a significant
percentage of foreclosures. Democrats in Congress began gathering ideas
for a government-sponsored remedy. Many of those ideas came from the
industry. Lobbyists and congressional aides referred to one concept as
“the Credit Suisse plan.” Another, “the Bank of America plan,” would
allow borrowers to refinance mortgages with loans guaranteed by the
Federal Housing Administration. Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.),
the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, had solicited
BofA’s advice via an old Boston acquaintance, Anne Finucane, the bank’s
chief marketing executive and a politically active Democrat. He assigned
several aides, including Michael M. Paese and Rick Delfin, to work out
the details.
Francis Creighton, a Democratic former staff member on the Financial
Services panel who had gone to work as a lobbyist for the Mortgage
Bankers Assn., negotiated with Paese and Delfin. Creighton’s Republican
colleague Gustafson huddled with aides to such GOP lawmakers as
Representative Spencer Bachus and Senator Richard Shelby, both of Alabama.
Before long, the anti-foreclosure provisions were being altered in ways
the industry favored. Shelby, the ranking Republican on the Senate
Banking Committee, along with other Republicans insisted on the
pro-industry language in exchange for their support, aides say.
In the end, the program included stiff up-front and annual fees and a
requirement that homeowners pay the government 50% of any future
appreciation in the property’s value—all of which made it much less
attractive to borrowers. Moreover, the banks’ participation was made
entirely voluntary; there was no way to pressure them to cooperate.
Congress approved Hope for Homeowners on July 26, 2008, as part of a
larger measure imposing restrictions on the mortgage finance firms
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. At the Mortgage Bankers Assn., lobbyists gathered in Gustafson’s corner office to lift plastic cups of wine in celebration.
Those familiar with Hope for Homeowners anticipated that its fine print
would discourage all but a few borrowers. “We knew it was likely to have
limited appeal,” says Preston, the former secretary of HUD, which
oversees the FHA. George Miller, executive director of the American
Securitization Forum, a Wall Street trade group, calls the program and
its 25 refinanced loans “useless” because of the onerous details.
BROKEN BILL
Shelby, for his part, never expected Hope for Homeowners to accomplish
much, according to Republican Senate aides. He agreed to it to gain
Dodd’s support for greater regulation of Fannie and Freddie—and only
when assured the program wouldn’t drain tax dollars. “My consistent aim
throughout this crisis has been to protect the American taxpayer,”
Shelby told /BusinessWeek/ in a statement. He accepted $565,000 in
contributions from the financial-services industry in 2007-2008.
Frank, whose industry contributions totaled $948,000 over the same
period, says he became skeptical Hope for Homeowners could achieve its
initial goal of helping 1 million people. But he expected much more
progress than the mere 25 refinancings that have occurred so far,
according to HUD. He blames Republicans and the industry for
undercutting his legislation. “I didn’t have the votes to do more,” he
says.
The Massachusetts liberal hasn’t given up hope of repairing Hope for
Homeowners. He is working on changes that would cut borrowers’ up-front
fees and provide bonus money for mortgage servicers that agree to
participate in the voluntary program. Frank aides Paese and Delfin
aren’t assisting with the fixes: They have left their congressional
staff positions for lobbying jobs with the Securities Industry &
Financial Markets Assn. in Washington. They say they are observing the
one-year federal ban on speaking with their former boss about business
they did on the Hill.
In the first days of 2009 it appeared that progress might be possible on
a different front. A slumping Citigroup came back to the Treasury Dept.
for a second round of bailout money. Bowing to pressure from regulators,
Citi broke ranks with its rivals and dropped its opposition to
bankruptcy cramdown. Senator Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), who since 2007 had led unsuccessful efforts in Congress to give bankruptcy judges authority to modify home loans, dispatched his senior economic policy adviser, Brad J. McConnell, to talk with lobbyists for JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America. “Each agreed to take [the idea] back to their folks to see what they could
do,” says a person familiar with the talks. Citi’s concession, the
imminent Obama inauguration, and intensifying public hostility toward
big banks contributed to an atmosphere Democrats assumed would be
conducive to compromise.
TALKING POINTS
By the time McConnell talked to the JPMorgan and BofA representatives
the next day, however, “they had gone on full defense mode and started
to complain about how lousy a deal Citi had struck,” says the person
familiar with the exchanges. Bank opposition, Durbin says, “was very
shortsighted in light of the mess they have created in our economy.”
In the following weeks, banking lobbyists launched a renewed attack on
the cramdown legislation, enlisting as an ally Republican Representative
Lamar Smith of Texas, among others. Apart from Citi, “the industry
remains united in that bankruptcy cramdown would destabilize the market”
by creating widespread uncertainty about the value of numerous troubled
mortgages, says Steve O’Connor, senior vice-president for government
relations at the Mortgage Bankers Assn. His group is distributing
talking points to key congressional aides laying out reasons why
“Congress should defeat bankruptcy reform legislation.” These include
the argument that if lenders can’t be confident that loan terms will
survive, they will raise rates and reject riskier borrowers. Industry
lobbyists are organizing home state bankers to pressure moderate
Democrats they hope will be receptive to limiting the kinds of loans
eligible for cramdown. One target: Senator Evan Bayh of Indiana.
Stefanie and James Smith of Santa Clarita, Calif., fear they may need
the help of a bankruptcy court if they are to keep the subdivision home
they bought for $579,000 in November 2005. Stefanie, 37, a university
human resources coordinator, and James, 40, a federal law enforcement
agent, borrowed the entire amount in two subprime loans that required a
total monthly payment of $3,000. A representative of their lender,
Countrywide, told them not to worry, says Stefanie: They would be able
to refinance in a year.
By mid-2007 they were running late on payments, and refinancing options
had dried up. With their monthly bill scheduled to jump to more than
$4,000 this January due to a rising mortgage rate, Stefanie contacted
Countrywide last summer. She asked for a loan modification so they could
avoid default. In December the lender said it would be willing to
increase their payment by $600. That was better than the scheduled rise
of $1,100, so the Smiths agreed.
But now they are struggling to pay the higher amount. Countrywide’s
parent, BofA, declined to comment, citing the Smiths’ privacy. After
BusinessWeek’s questions, though, Countrywide called them to discuss
cutting their payments.
“We knew when we bought that the payments would be a stretch,” says
Stefanie. She regrets assuming they would be able to refinance at a
lower rate. “We are not deadbeats,” she adds. “All we want is a mortgage
we can afford.”
By Carmen Dellutri on Janaury 28, 2009
A Las Vegas Jury recently awarded a family $3.4 million in a wrongful foreclosure case. As you can guess, this wasn’t your everyday foreclosure. It kind of reminds you of the McDonalds hot coffee case. After testimony, the Jury found that Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. wrongfully foreclosed on the Plaintiff’s condo and awarded the Plaintiff $922,690 in compensatory damages and $2.5 million dollars in punitive damages. As a lawyer who regularly sues insurance companies, mortgage companies and credit card companies, I think the Jury got it right.The Plaintiffs had temporarily moved to Tucson, Arizona for work. Countrywide sued for foreclosure, wrongfully, and sold the condo. The Plaintiffs discovered what happened in 2003. Somewhere down the line, the Plaintiff’s personal possessions were discarded and some items, including a wedding dress and family photos, may have been thrown into the trash. How could something like this happen? Good Question. The foreclosure was supposed to happen on another condo.
As a lawyer, you always wonder why this case wasn’t resolved by Countrywide prior to the trial. One can only guess as to what Countrywide was thinking. Normally, the two sides just don’t value the case in the same way. I would like to congratulate the Plaintiff’s attorney on a job well done. Countrywide said in a statement that they are very disappointed in the result. Yea, imagine that. Now, they will probably spend a fortune appealing the juries decision, instead of doing the right thing and paying the Plaintiffs for their screw-up.
The Florida Fair Lending Act, Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, prohibits predatory tactics on high cost home loans, including:
* Charging prepayment penalties for longer than three years
* Increased interest on loans going into default
* Balloon payments on loans that mature in less than 10 years
* Extending credit regardless of a borrower’s ability to pay
* Making direct payments to home improvement contractors
* Calling a loan due even though the borrower has complied with the terms of the loan
* Refinancing a loan during the first 18 months, unless there is a benefit to the borrower
* Offering to originate a loan at the borrower’s home without a prearranged appointment
* Charging late fees that exceed five percent of the payment
The law also requires lenders to disclose certain facts about the loan at least three days prior to closing the deal, including:
* A mortgage will be placed on the borrower’s home, and they could lose the home in the event of foreclosure.
* Interest rates and terms can vary, depending on the lender or broker.
* Borrowers should consider consulting a HUD approved credit counseling agency or a financial advisor regarding financing of their home.
* Debt consolidation can be a useful tool if the borrower does not take on additional short-term debts.
* Loan applicants do not have to accept the loan, even though they have filled out an application.
Individuals can file for bankruptcy in a federal court under Chapter 7 (”straight bankruptcy”, or liquidation) or Chapter 13 (a “consumer reorganization”, or debt adjustment case). (Although individuals can technically file Chapter 11 bankruptcies, those filings are rare. They typically happen if the individual’s debt load is too high for a chapter 13 and they do not qualify for a chapter 7).
In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the individual is allowed to keep certain exempt property. Most liens, however (such as real estate mortgages and security interests for car loans), survive. Many types of unsecured debt are legally discharged by the bankruptcy proceeding, but there are various types of debt that are not discharged in a Chapter 7. Common exceptions to discharge include child support, income taxes less than 3 years old and property taxes, student loans (unless the debtor prevails in a difficult-to-win adversary proceeding brought to determine the dischargeability of the student loan), and fines and restitution imposed by a court for any crimes committed by the debtor. Spousal Support is likewise not covered by a bankruptcy filing nor are property settlements through divorce. Despite the non-dischargeability of these debts, they must be listed on your bankruptcy schedules, as all debts (and all assets) must be listed.
There are various legal requirements that a Florida condo developer must comply with in order to offer for sale condo units and if your developer fails to carefully follow some of these legal requirements, you may be able to terminate your contract for purchase.
For example, under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (”ILSFDA”) or Florida law, you may have the right to terminate the contract for your pre-construction condominium or home and receive all, or part of your deposit back. ILSFDA places certain requirements and responsibilities upon developers to make disclosures relating to the condition of real property. ILSFDA also contains anti-fraud provisions which impose civil liability to developers who make false or misleading promises. In the booming real estate market of the past decade, consumers paid large deposits for condo units only to experience delays of up to three (3) years between the signing of a contract and closing. Also many contracts for the pre-construction purchase of condo contain provisions that attempt to eliminate all your rights for the benefit of the developer, this may cause the contract to become voidable and allow you to receive your deposit back from the developer, contact us to review your pre-construction contract.
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